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I. INTRODUCTION 
Appellant, (hereafter "Beck"), argued two issues in this appeal, that law 
enforcement illegally entered the curtilage of the defendant's home without a search 
warrant, and that questioning by law enforcement was unwarned and coercive 
mandating suppression of all admissions/confessions. 
II. ARGUMENT 
WARRANTLESS ENTRY 
Appellant will sequentially address matters as listed in the state's response brief. 
At Pagel under the Statement Of Facts heading, the state declares that the officers 
were investigating individual smoking marijuana. The testimony that an individual was 
smoking marijuana was objected to and sustained by the magistrate at the suppression 
hearing, ((Tr p 11,1124-25, through p 12,11 1-17). This information known to the officer 
was used to explain subsequent conduct- making contact with Beck. The state has not 
established by admissible and competent evidence that the officers had knowledge of 
illegal activities by Beck prior to the illegal entry on the premises and un-warned and 
coercive questioning, and the purported fact that officers were investigating an illegal 
activity should not be used by this Court. 
The state cites State v Basher, 629 F.3d 1161, 1169 (9th Cir. 2011), for the 
proposition that the area directly around Beck's tent is not curtilage because Beck did not 
own the property, (Brief of Respondent, (hereafter "St Brf'), p 6-7). This argument is 
wrong. In Basher, the court held as follows: 
"In United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 107 S.Ct. 1134,94 L.Ed.2d 326 (1987), 
the Supreme Court found that curtilage is defined by reference to four factors: proximity 
of the area to the home, the nature of the uses to which the area is put, whether the area is 
included in an enclosure around the home, and the steps taken by the resident to protect 
the area from observation. Id. at 301, 107 S.Ct. 1l34. While these factors can be 
employed with reasonable certainty in the urban residential environment, the analysis 
does not necessarily carryover to most camping contexts. Parkland campsites often have 
layouts that are vague or dispersed, and individuals often camp in areas that are not 
predetermined campsites., (emphasis by the author in the present case). 
In the case at bar, Basher was staying in a dispersed, or undeveloped camping 
area. It appears that Basher's camp was visible from the developed camping area where 
the officers had stayed the previous night. Therefore, we hold that there was no 
expectation of privacy in the campsite, and that the area outside of the tent in these 
circumstances is not curtilage. Accordingly, Struckman does not control the outcome of 
this case." 
The court in Basher found under the facts of that case that the area outside of the 
tent was not curtilage. In this case, utilizing the Dunn, (supra), factors, the area 
immediately surrounding Beck's tent was curtilage based on the following: The curtilage 
was adjacent to/touching the home/tent; The nature of the use was the immediate area 
where personal items were stored; The area is included in the area around the home as 
this curtilage is in a defined camp site versus the "dispersed or undeveloped camping 
area"· in Dunn; And the step taken to protect the area from observation was pitching the 
I The campsites in this area were discemable from other campsites, (Tr p 22, II 5-10), so they were 
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tent behind a tree that law enforcement had to walk around in order to observe the 
paraphernalia. Curtilage is not defined by ownership; curtilage is defined by location and 
use by the resident. Once again, the paraphernalia was not observable unless/until the 
officers illegally entered constitutionally protected space. 
UNWARNED/COERCIVE QUESTIONING 
In the state's response brief, they do a very admirable job of citing relevant and 
applicable case law, (St Brfp 7-10), and when this Court utilizes these factors, there is no 
doubt Beck was in custody for purposes of Miranda and that the questioning was 
coercive. 
The custody status of Beck is set out in the Statement of Facts section in Beck's 
initial brief, but bears repeating here in light of the state's arguments in the Response 
Brief: Beck was asleep in his tent with his girlfriend when officers arrived and attempted 
to wake him up. The officers woke Beck's girlfriend up, and instructed her to awaken 
Beck. This was accomplished with some effort. Beck was ordered/requested to sit in a 
chair " ... when Mr. Beck got belligerent.", (Tr p 60,1121-22). The officers then showed 
him the paraphernalia, and he was questioned about the paraphernalia. Beck at first 
denied knowledge of the paraphernalia, told three different stories about the 
paraphernalia, and eventually made admissions/confessions. Beck was arrested and taken 
into custody as a result of this contact and questioning, (Tr p 26, 11 21-23)? This contact 
was not a Terry stop. When a citizen is roused from sleep in his home by armed and 
uniformed law enforcement officers and ordered to sit in a chair due to his belligerent 
"defined" under the Dunn criteria. Beck argued in appellant's brief that the campground was primitive, 
with "primitive" meaning lack of immediate access to water and toilet facilities. 
2 Beck failed to include the fact he was arrested as a result of contact with law enforcement in his initial 
brief. 
behavior, he is seized for purposes of Miranda. The questioning was prolonged and 
repeated in that three stories were elicited. The main factor is Beck was shown the 
paraphernalia and then questioned about it. 
The state argues that this Court should not consider Beck's affidavit, (St Br p 9). 
The affidavit is part of the record as it was attached to the initial motion to suppress, Beck 
acknowledged and testified s to the contents of the affidavit under oath, and was subject 
to cross examination at the hearing. In addition, the contents in the affidavit were 
established through direct and cross examination of the state's witnesses. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Magistrate Judge abused his discretion in the following ways: This was a 
Terry investigation, Beck was not in custody for purposes of Miranda, and that the 
questioning was not coercive. Further, in finding no violation of constitutional rights 
when police intruded into a constitutionally protected area without a search warrant. The 
District Court sitting in an appellate capacity should not have affirmed these findings. 
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